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Abstract  
To ensure that the new deal for energy customers and citizens materialises, the engagement of 
consumer organisations, energy communities and NGOs on the topics of network tariffs and network 
codes is essential. This text, developed for an FSR online training course specifically targeted at this 
group of stakeholders, aims to facilitate that engagement. In the first chapter, we discuss the main 
principles of distribution network tariff design, guiding the reader from the (theoretical) first-best 
distribution network design all the way to why the current practices were adopted. Subsequently, 
issues with current practices are discussed, and possible tools to overcome these challenges are briefly 
described. In the second chapter, we focus on EU electricity network codes. On the basis of a discussion 
around the balancing mechanism, we show that the network codes and guidelines imply certain 
obligations for all relevant parties, but that they also create opportunities.  
 
Keywords: Distribution Grid Cost Recovery, Distribution Network Tariff Design, Active Consumers, 
Network Codes and Guidelines, Balance Responsibility, Imbalance Settlement, Balancing Markets  
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1. Distribution network tariff design 
 Introduction 
1.1.1 The electricity bill: the components and who is responsible for what? 
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of consumer electricity bills in capital cities across Europe. It shows that 
the electricity bill broadly consists of three components: energy costs, taxes and levies, and network 
charges.  
 
Figure 1: Breakdown of incumbents’ standard offers for households in EU capital cities and total 
bill – November-December 2016 (ACER and CEER, 2017a) 
In 2016 energy costs represented on average 35% of the final bill but they have declined (at least 
relatively) every year since 2012, as is shown in Figure 2. Energy costs depend on the wholesale 
electricity market. In this market, electricity retailers buy electricity on behalf of their contracted 
customers. The final energy price a consumer sees will reflect the market conditions to a certain extent. 
Depending on the arrangement with the retailer, the final price for the consumer, expressed in euros 
per kWh, can be either time-varying or time-invariant.  
 
Figure 2: Weighted average of the electricity post-taxes total bill (POTP) and breakdown of 
incumbents’ standard offers for households in EU capitals and Oslo – 2012-2016 (ACER and CEER, 
2017a) 
Taxes and levies represented on average 38% of the electricity bill in 2016. Value-Added Tax (VAT), 
averaging 15% in the EU, is added as a percentage of the final electricity bill. Levies in the electricity 
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bill are increasing yearly, as is shown in Figure 2, and made up about 23% of the bill in 2016. Levies are 
recuperated through the consumer bill to pay for energy policy costs, e.g. renewable subsidies or 
surcharges. Levies are paid, in most cases, in proportion to the electricity volume consumed, i.e. in 
euros per kWh or by a fixed charge per consumer. The high-cost burden of energy policy and how these 
costs are spread across different types of grid users has provoked an intense public debate, see e.g.  
Bohringer et al. (2017) discussing the German case. The allocation of these costs and whether they 
should be recovered through the electricity bill at all is up to the government. This debate is not the 
focus of this text. 
 
A topic of even greater interest today is how to design the distribution network (access) tariff, which 
is currently the main method for recovering distribution network costs from consumers. In 2016, the 
proportion of total network charges in electricity bills averaged around 27% in the EU. The largest 
chunk of network charges in a consumer bill are the distribution network charges. Distribution network 
charges ranged from 16 % to 48% of the bill, while for transmission network charges these percentages 
were between approximately 0% and 9%. For simplicity, throughout this text, when we refer to 
network charges, we mean distribution network charges. The reason distribution network tariffs are 
discussed so much today is generally not because they have been increasing – indeed Figure 2 shows 
that the proportion of network charges in the bill has been relatively stable in recent years – but, 
instead, because of their design. Figure 3 shows how distribution network tariffs were designed for EU 
households in 2016. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution network cost recovery in Europe by Compass Lexecon (2016) based on 
European Commission (2015) 
The first thing to note in Figure 3 is that methods of grid costs recuperation and the structures of 
distribution tariffs are not harmonised across Europe. Similarly, as with transmission tariffs, the shares 
of volumetric/capacity component for distribution tariffs vary significantly across EU countries. A  
second important fact demonstrated by Figure 3 and also described in a report by the European 
Commission (EC) (2016), is that the majority of distribution grid tariffs mainly consist of volumetric 
charges. The EC report specifies that 69% of the revenue from households, 54% for small industrial 
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consumers and 58% for large industrial consumers are recuperated through volumetric tariffs. The 
Netherlands is an exception as there is no volumetric component in the distribution network tariff for 
households. 
 
As the network tariff is regulated, it is the National Regulatory Authority (NRA), not the market, that 
has the final say on the distribution network tariff design. In some EU countries, the NRA is solely 
responsible for the tariff design; in other EU countries NRAs and DSOs share the responsibility, e.g. the 
NRA decides on higher level principles, while the DSO proposes the tariff structure and level that needs 
to be approved by the NRA (EC, 2015 and recital 36 of Directive 2009/72/EC).  
1.1.2 Other ways than access tariffs to recuperate distribution network costs 
In the debate about the recovery of distribution grid costs, the focus is mostly on the distribution 
network access tariff, i.e. the one you pay as part of your monthly or semestrial electricity bill. Besides 
the network access tariff, network connection charges and distribution locational marginal pricing 
(DLMP) are other ways to (partly) recuperate distribution grid costs. In practice, at least today, 
distribution grid costs will be recovered by a combination of the connection charges and the 
distribution network access tariff.  
Connection charges 
Connection charges, as the name indicates, are (in most cases) a one-off charge paid for the connection 
to the grid. In general, three types of connection charges can be distinguished: super-shallow, shallow, 
and deep connection charges. The degree to which connection charges fully reflect the incremental 
cost of providing a user with a new or upgraded connection to the network depends on the type of 
connection charge.  
 
With super-shallow connection charges basically no costs are charged for the connection. Shallow 
connection charges imply that grid users pay for the local infrastructure connection costs (the cable 
between a house and local feeder and other necessary equipment); these costs are easily attributed 
to a specific user. Deep connection charges consist of the shallow charges plus possibly incurred costs 
for wider network reinforcements needed to accommodate the connection request. Deep connection 
charges are designed to fully reflect the incremental cost of providing a user with a new or increased 
connection to the network.  
 
Shallow connection charges solely recover the connection from the user to the grid. Shallow 
connection charges generally do not ‘steer’ consumer behaviour, i.e. whether you connect your house 
or shop to a point in the distribution grid where there is very little or significant congestion, it does not 
affect your connection charge. On the other hand, deeper connection charges do send a signal to grid 
users. Namely, you will have to pay a different connection charge whether or not you connect to a 
point in the grid where there is already significant congestion. Deep connection charges will ‘guide’ 
grid users to connect to less congested points of the grid.1 A major issue with deep connection charges 
is that new entrants will pay more than users that are already connected to the grid. Grid investment 
                                                           
1 An innovative tool in that regard are network capacity maps indicating the available hosting capacities at 
different points in the distribution network see e.g. 
http://www.westernpower.co.uk/connections/generation/network-capacity-map.aspx and 
https://www.capareseau.fr/  
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happens, in practice, in discrete (‘lumpy’) steps, a grid user connecting at the moment the grid is 
utilised near its maximum would have to pay the entire upgrade. Another difficulty with this type of 
charge is that the costs imposed on the network by the user need to be estimated before actual grid 
usage.  
 
Ofgem (2017), Great Britain’s (GB) regulator, describes a practical implementation of distribution 
connection charges. They state that in Great Britain the distribution connection charging regime is 
referred to as ‘shallow-ish’. Next to the full cost of assets that will be used solely by the connecting 
customer2, connection charges can also recover a portion of the deeper reinforcement costs to the 
existing network needed to provide the user with firm access to the system. However, charges paid for 
the deeper reinforcement of the wider grid seem to be limited. Namely, in Ofgem (2014) it is reported 
that 95% of connections between 2011-2014 did not trigger any network reinforcement. Additionally, 
where a connection project triggered reinforcement, the connecting customer paid 59% of the 
associated costs. The other 41% of the costs were socialised through the network access tariff. 
Distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) 
Another way to recuperate grid costs is through Distribution Locational Marginal Pricing (DLMP), 
meaning that different locations (in the extreme case: nodes) in the network can reflect different 
energy prices at a certain point in time. The principle applied in DLMP is borrowed from transmission 
grid cost recovery and could also, in theory, be applied to distribution networks to recover part of the 
costs. In Figure 4 a simple example of locational pricing applied at nodal level is shown. 
 
Figure 4: Simple example of locational marginal pricing. Left, no congestion. Right, congestion. 
The left side of Figure 4 shows a situation without congestion (meaning the line is not utilised at its full 
capacity) between the two nodes N1 and N2. The price of the two nodes will be the same if we assume 
no energy losses. In this case, there is no congestion rent or income for the owner of the line. The right 
side of Figure 4 shows a situation in which there is congestion between the two nodes. A price 
difference between the nodes occurs now. Electricity will always flow from the node with the lower 
price to the node with the higher price. The congestion rent, i.e. the income for the line owner, is 
calculated as the capacity of the line multiplied by the price difference between the nodes. Prices can 
change during each market time unit (e.g. 1 hour or 15 minutes), i.e. congestion can occur or disappear 
depending on the electricity flows resulting from electricity trade. Thus, by applying distribution 
locational prices very short-term price signals are sent, informing grid users about the underlying 
network constraints. 
 
                                                           
2 Ofgem (2014) explains that the cost of the assets solely used by the connecting consumer will be based on the 
‘minimum scheme’.  The minimum scheme is the solution designed solely to provide the capacity needed for the 
new connection at the lowest overall capital cost. A DSO may design an enhanced scheme (e.g. additional assets 
to accommodate a larger capacity or assets of a different specification) but the cost to the customer will not 
exceed that of the minimum scheme. The customer can also request works in excess of the minimum scheme, 
when it thinks this would be more beneficial. 
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The concept of locational marginal pricing is applied in European electricity markets at the transmission 
level. Namely, the European electricity market is organised as a set of bidding zones, which in most 
cases overlap with national borders. The network within these bidding zones is seen as a copper plate 
– no congestion is assumed – implying that within a bidding zone the electricity price is always uniform. 
However, the different bidding zones are connected through transmission lines (‘cross-zonal 
interconnectors’) for which the scarce capacity is taken into account by the market, a mechanism called 
implicit cross-zonal transmission capacity allocation. This means that if the interconnectors between 
two bidding zones are not congested at a certain point in time, the electricity price will be equal over 
the two bidding zones (so-called market coupling). If the interconnectors are congested, the electricity 
price in the two bidding zones will diverge (so-called market splitting).3 Figure 5 illustrates price 
convergence between different bidding zones within certain regions in the EU. For example, the Baltics 
consist of three bidding zones representing respectively Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. During 2016 the 
(day-ahead) electricity price between those three countries converged about 70% of the time. 
 
Figure 5: Day-ahead price convergence in the EU by region as % of hours, 2011-2016 (ACER and 
CEER, 2017b) 
This also means that 30% of the time at least one bidding zone had a different price due to one or 
multiple interconnectors being congested. This implies that during those moments congestion rent 
was generated. This revenue is raised from the day-ahead auction in which the electricity prices in the 
different bidding zones is jointly determined as illustrated with an example in Box 1.  
 
Box 1: Numerical example: the generation of congestion rent with implicit capacity allocation 
Suppose that the day-ahead market auction for a certain hour results in a price in zone A of 50 
€/MWh and a price in zone B of 60€/MWh. The satisfied demand in zone A is 100 MW, the satisfied 
demand in zone B is 150 MW and the interconnector capacity allocated for trade between the two 
zones was 50 MW. As there is a price differential between the two zones, it implies that the cross-
zonal interconnector capacity is fully utilized, i.e. the total electricity flowing through the 
interconnector is 50 MW.  Electricity flows from the low price zone (A) to the high price zone (B). 
 
                                                           
3 For more information, see e.g. Meeus and Schittekatte (2018), Section 2.2, in which the concept of bidding 
zones is explained more profoundly and Chapter 5, which describes the way cross-zonal capacity is allocated and 
calculated. 
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 Price Demand Generation Demand cost Generation cost 
Zone A 50 €/MWh 100 MW 
150 MW 
(demand zone A + 
interconnector) 
€ 5,000 € 7,500 
Zone B 60 €/MWh 150 MW 
100 MW 
(demand zone B - 
interconnector) 
€ 9,000 € 6,000 
    € 14,000 € 13,500 
 
The total amount collected by generation over the two zones is €13,500 while the total amount 
spent by demand equals €14,000. The difference between the two is the congestion rent of €500 
equalling the price differential between the two zones (€10/MWh) multiplied by the capacity of the 
line (50 MW). This congestion rent is transferred to the TSO(s) owning the interconnector.  
 
In Figure 6 the average annual congestion revenue and how it was spent per country over the period 
of 2011-2015 is shown. 
 
Figure 6: Average annual congestion rent and allocation of the rent per country for the period 
between 2011 and 2015  (ECN et al., 2017) 
There are precise rules specifying how the obtained congestion revenues should be spent. More 
specifically, Art. 16 (6) of the Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity states that priority should be given to using this money to 
guarantee the actual availability of the allocated capacity or to maintain or increase cross-zonal 
interconnection capacity. However, if the revenues cannot efficiently be used for those purposes, they 
can be used to lower the (transmission) network tariffs up to a maximum amount decided upon by the 
relevant NRA. Remaining money should be saved to use for priority purposes when necessary in the 
future. 
 
Obstacles would have to be overcome to apply the locational marginal prices (LMP) to distribution 
networks in order to recover part of the grid costs. There are two main issues: a public acceptance 
issue and a technical issue. First, if locational pricing is applied at the distribution level, it would mean 
that different areas of a distribution network would see different energy prices at certain points in 
time. This could be perceived as unfair because this price difference is mainly created by the 
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investment decisions in infrastructure by DSOs in the past and not by consumers who happen to live 
in an area which could see a rise in prices. The technical issue relates to the fact that the number of 
lines and nodes at the distribution level is much higher than at the transmission level. Applying 
locational pricing at the transmission level is computationally already challenging, with the number of 
zones being the main parameter affecting the time to compute all prices. Innovations in algorithms 
and computational power will be required if a similar calculation is to be made at the distribution level. 
Also, real-time information about all flows in the lines as well as about the injection and withdrawal of 
electricity at all nodes is required. This is a very challenging task and will entail significant investments 
in IT to turn the distribution grid into a ‘smart grid’.  
 
Abdelmotteleb et al. (2016) explain that the major difference between LMP used in transmission and 
distribution are the losses and congestion portions. In distribution networks, losses have a more 
relevant role than in transmission.4 Moreover, congestion is rarer in DLMP calculations since 
distribution network topology is generally radial and feeds energy from one point. Abdelmotteleb et 
al. (2016) also add that even if DLMP were implemented, complementary network charges are needed 
to fully recover the network costs and to send efficient long-term signals to network users. 
 Principles and theory of distribution network tariff design 
After distilling the relevant literature, we came up with three general principles for distribution 
network tariff design. Namely, a tariff should be cost-reflective, it should allow the recovery of 
efficiently incurred grid costs and, finally, it should be fair. 
1.2.1 Cost-reflectiveness 
An important principle of distribution network tariff design is cost-reflectiveness. Cost-reflectiveness 
implies that the cost a consumer imposes on the network should be reflected by the network tariff. In 
short, one should pay the price for one’s own actions. In theory, by having a cost-reflective tariff the 
consumer can make an informed decision about whether to use the network at a certain time (for 
which she will pay the imposed cost) or whether to change her consumption behaviour for which she 
will have attributed a value or for which she has to invest in Distributed Energy Resources (DER).5 If 
network charges are not cost-reflective, it means that consumers will not see the correct trade-off 
between utilising the network or adjusting their consumption at a certain point in time. Two situations 
can occur: 
 
• First, the network tariff can be too low, meaning that the consumers’ actions impose more 
costs than the network charges they would have to pay. This means that we end up in a 
situation with an overly expensive grid as the consumers are not incentivised enough to adapt 
their actions, leading to a higher total system cost. An example would be that consumers who 
have an intelligent heating system driven by a heat pump command their house to be heated 
at moments when the electricity (including the grid) is priced cheaply even when the network 
                                                           
4 Losses in distribution can vary widely and are typically in the order of 4-10 % of the total energy offtake (see 
e.g. the MIT Energy Initiative (2016)). In transmission, losses are around 1-2 % of the energy offtake (see e.g. 
Elia). 
5 In this section we assume the consumer to be the decision-maker, this is not always the case. An example can 
be a less affluent family renting a flat in the city with little to say on which investments to make in the building, 
including the heating system, let alone solar panels on a roof. Fairness and inflexible/passive consumers are 
further discussed in Subsection 3.3.   
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is near congestion. If many people do so, it would eventually mean that the network needs to 
be expanded, while this would not have been the case if the network tariff was cost-reflective 
thus incentivizing the consumer to programme their heating at times when the utilisation of 
the grid was low. In the end, all consumers will have to pay back the cost of this (avoidable) 
network expansion through the tariff. 
 
• Second, the network tariff can be too high, meaning that the consumers’ actions impose less 
costs than the network charges they have to pay. Using the same example, if network charges 
are too high, it could mean that consumers opt for gas heating instead of electric heating. Even 
though, if the network charges were designed to be cost-reflective, electric heating could have 
been a cheaper option as the electricity network could accommodate the extra load without 
issue, under the condition that the heating would be correctly programmed. This would mean 
that we end up in a situation with overpriced actions by the consumers and an underutilised 
grid, leading again to a higher total system cost for the final energy service than if the network 
tariff was designed properly. 
 
In short, the idea is that a cost-reflective tariff will lead a cost-efficient outcome. What is meant with 
a cost-efficient outcome is that the cost-reflective tariff will lead to the overall lowest final cost for 
serving the electricity needs of all consumers. 
 
When wanting to design a cost-reflective tariff, we need to know what cost to reflect, in other words, 
what drives the grid cost. Generally, it is agreed in the literature that the main cost driver of an 
electricity network, whether it is distribution or transmission, is the maximum peak demand 
aggregated over all consumers, also called the ‘coincident peak demand’. A line or feeder is 
dimensioned to cope with the maximum power in kW or MW it is expected to carry at a certain point 
in time, not by the volume in kWh or MWh it is expected to transmit over a certain time period. This is 
very similar to highways or telecom lines. Other cost drivers could include losses or for example, the 
penetration of solar PV which could induce bi-directional flows and thus require investment in 
additional electronics (e.g. protection and voltage regulation) in the grid. For more information see 
also the Future of Solar Report by the MIT Energy Initiative (2015) and Chapter 9 of IEA (2016). 
 
So what does such a cost-reflective tariff look like in theory? For example, the Utility of the Future 
report by the MIT Energy Initiative (2016)6 explains that a cost-reflective distribution network tariff 
consists of a forward-looking peak-coincident capacity charge. The capacity-based charge should be 
computed as the incremental cost of the network divided by expected load growth, the so-called long-
run marginal cost (LRMC) of the network. However, there are constraints making the introduction of 
this tariff more difficult in reality; we divide them into two groups: implementation constraints (due 
to a lack of information and fairness concerns) and a cost-recovery issue. 
 
First, implementation constraints: LRMC pricing is not so easy to implement in distribution grids. 
Gómez (2013) describes the distribution networks as follows: ‘A friend of mine who worked in a 
distribution company likened electric power generation and transmission to a bull and distribution to a 
beehive. Whereas generation and transmission comprise comparatively few and very large-scale 
facilities, distribution involves a much larger number and wider variety of equipment and components.’ 
                                                           
6 See e.g.  also Box 4.6 (p. 115-116) in that report. 
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In other words, it is hard to get a complete picture of the distribution network. Plus, there is a lack of 
information about the network flows in real-time requiring significant investments in IT infrastructure 
in most countries. Without this information, it is almost impossible to truly reflect the grid costs in the 
tariff as it is not clear what is really going on in the network.  
 
In order to apply LRMC pricing, a value for the LRMC needs to be estimated, and this value should be 
charged at the moment the coincident peak demand comes near to the maximum capacity of the 
network. Regarding the LRMC estimate (in €/kW increment in demand), e.g. Cohen et al. (2016) uses 
Californian data and finds that the LRMC can be very location specific. Additionally, as described by 
Batlle et al. (2017), a marginal increment must be defined, but such choice is hardly justifiable, and it 
can alter the outcome of the allocation, especially in industries such as the power sector, characterised 
by economies of scale and lumpiness or discreteness of investments. Regarding targeting the 
coincident peak demand, e.g. Passey et al. (2017) use Australian data to show that demand profiles 
and the timing of the network peaks vary widely across networks and at different voltage levels, mostly 
depending on the mix of consumers connected. This implies that to implement such optimal cost-
reflective tariffs, the regulator should know what is going on in the network in real-time, have good 
cost estimates of all equipment and adequately define a correct increment. In practice, such 
information is hard to obtain or lacking. 
 
Also, if all information were available then such tariffs should have a very fine locational and temporal 
granularity. In the extreme case, in order to apply it perfectly, it would almost be a user-by-user tariff. 
However, generally, a tariff per region or DSO area is applied in Europe (EC, 2015). This is mostly done 
for reasons of simplicity and fairness.7 Batlle et al. (2017) explain that in reality, such fine granularity is 
impossible and that some degree of consumer clustering is required. The authors continue that in the 
electricity sector, consumers have traditionally been grouped by voltage level, node location, 
consumption category (residential versus industrial), or even according to the occurrence of their peak 
load if a time‐differentiation is applied. It is clear that each grouping alternative represents an 
(arbitrary) approximation of the LRMC and the timing of the peak, that may, to a greater or lesser 
degree, affect the overall cost-efficiency of the methodology. Moreover, there might be an issue with 
applying a forward-looking charge. If you announce to grid users that at a certain point in the future 
the coincident-peak is expected and thus higher network charges will have to be paid, it is possible 
that users react ex-ante and that the ‘expected coincident peak’ is no longer a coincident-peak in 
reality anymore (so-called peak shifting). Alternatively, if the coincident peak is determined ex-post its 
occurrence, it is hard to send price signals to grid users and their total network charges to be paid 
become more unpredictable. 
 
                                                           
7 Imagine you live in a district that has not seen an upgrade of the local grid infrastructure in the last decade and 
local demand is increasing. If a cost-reflective network tariff with finer locational granularity were applied, it is 
possible that grid tariffs would suddenly become substantially higher at certain times in your neighbourhood. 
This would happen to incentivise grid users to adjust their electricity withdrawal and injection patterns at times 
the grid is stressed in order to avoid or postpone costly grid reinforcements. Another district could have been 
upgraded just a couple of years before the implementation of such a tariff with finer locational granularity. This 
district could then see fairly low and constant grid tariffs as there is little need for reinforcements. The difference 
in grid tariffs would be caused mainly because of choices of the DSO in the past on which affected grid users had 
little influence. Very location-specific tariffs could indeed increase cost-efficiency but they remove a certain 
‘socialisation’ of grid costs. 
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In Schittekatte and Meeus (2018) we demonstrate that if the regulator, in setting the tariff, does not 
anticipate inaccuracy in the proxy of the network cost driver, self-interest pursuing active consumers 
can make sub-optimal decisions in terms of DER investment, possibly leading to consumers investing 
more in DER than the level of grid and energy costs that are avoided; thus resulting in a worse outcome 
in terms of overall welfare. If the regulator anticipates this inaccuracy, the welfare loss can be reduced. 
 
Next to an implementation issue, there is a cost-recovery issue. It is well known (see e.g. Borenstein, 
2016; MIT Energy Initiative, 2016; Ofgem, 2017) that purely cost-reflective charges do not guarantee 
full cost recovery of the efficiently incurred grid costs. Actually, what cost-reflective network charges 
do is to send a signal to grid users to optimally make use of the network, leading to a cost-efficient 
outcome for all. However, cost-efficiency is decoupled from another objective, namely to recover all 
grid costs. In reality, some of the grid costs will be sunk, i.e. grid investments done in the past to meet 
future electricity demand and of which the total amount of costs is unaffected by the way the network 
is utilised. A cost-reflective tariff does not guarantee the recovery of all grid costs including the sunk 
grid costs. Therefore, a cost-reflective tariff, which is in theory the first-best solution from a cost-
efficiency point of view, needs to be complemented with another charge to recuperate these sunk 
costs. This leads us to the second principle of distribution network tariff design: cost-recovery. 
1.2.2 Cost-recovery 
The idea behind the cost-recovery principle is that the Distribution System Operator (DSO), the 
company responsible for maintaining, developing and operating the distribution network, must be able 
to recuperate its ‘efficiently incurred grid costs’.8 It should be noted that the DSO is a natural 
monopoly, meaning that it is cheaper to have one company building and operating the distribution 
network than multiple companies duplicating the necessary lines and competing for consumers to 
connect to their network. What this implies is that the tariff for using the network is not set by the 
DSO. Instead, it is the NRA that assesses how high the allowed revenue of a DSO should be and 
accordingly determines the network tariff. An exception is Spain, where allowed revenues are set by 
the Government (EC, 2016a). 
 
In general, incentive regulation should aim to guide DSOs to find an optimal balance between costs 
associated with investment, operation and maintenance, and energy losses on the one hand, and the 
quality of service provided on the other hand. To achieve higher quality, the company must incur 
greater costs and vice versa. However, the NRA can judge that some DSO expenditures were incurred 
inefficiently meaning that these costs cannot be recuperated through the tariff. For more information 
on incentive regulation of distribution grids see for example the chapter of Gómez in the Regulation of 
the Power Sector book by Pérez-Arriaga (2013). A recent detailed description of incentive regulation 
of electricity network companies can also be found in the first two chapters of the book by Meeus and 
Glachant (2018). In the first chapter, Rious and Rossetto (2018a) describe the history of incentive 
regulation in the British energy sector which was a pioneer in this respect. In the second chapter, Rious 
and Rossetto (2018b) discuss the implementation of monopoly regulation in Continental Europe. They 
explain that the choice of the best regulatory tools depends on the characteristics of the specific tasks 
of the regulated company and is constrained by the competency and resources of regulators. 
                                                           
8 The DSO can own the distribution network assets. Alternatively, these assets can also be owned by third parties 
(often municipalities) but managed by the DSO. In some jurisdictions the DSO is referred to as the Distribution 
Network Operator (DNO). 
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The (simplified) cost-recovery process occurs as follows. First, it is the NRA that determines the allowed 
revenue for x amount of years – the regulatory period.9 Then the tariffs are set by the NRA, possibly 
jointly with the DSO, anticipating future usage of the network and aiming to recover exactly the 
allowed revenue from the consumers. Imagine, for example, that the NRA decides that in the following 
years a DSO should be allowed to recover €1,000 per year through access charges, the network tariffs 
are volumetric (€/kWh) and the expected electricity volume consumed by its connected consumer is 
20,000 kWh per year. In that case, the network tariff for the next year should be set at 0.05 €/kWh. 
However, when checking the real consumption after the year has passed, it could be that the actual 
consumption was higher, meaning the DSO recuperated too much money, or lower, meaning the DSO 
did not recuperate enough money. In the former case, the DSO will have to give a rebate to its 
consumers the next time tariffs are set, in the latter case, the DSO will be allowed to set the tariff 
slightly higher the next time in order to recuperate the missing money. This example suggests that the 
DSO is indifferent about the tariff setting as they cannot keep more money than the allowed revenue 
which is set independently of the tariffs. However, this is only true if the tariff recovers the investment 
costs of the past. To the extent that the tariffs also influence the need for grid investment in the future, 
the future allowed revenue cannot be completely decoupled from the tariff design. 
 
So, how can the distribution network tariff be designed in the most cost-efficient way while making 
sure that all grid costs are recovered? In theory, the best way to design such minimal distortive charges 
is by applying Ramsey pricing. With this approach, the residual or sunk grid costs, the part of the grid 
costs not recuperated by purely cost-reflective charges, are assigned to consumers according to their 
elasticity to price. Inverse proportionality is followed; this means that a higher proportion of the 
residual network costs are allocated to those consumers who change their consumption behaviour the 
least in response to price changes. As such, the way the total grid costs are recuperated modifies as 
little as possible the optimal outcome compared to when consumer decisions are subjected solely to 
cost-reflective charges. In Schittekatte et al. (2018) we show the relative performance of different tariff 
designs other than Ramsey pricing in terms of cost-efficiency and distributional effects among 
consumers under the assumption that all grid costs are sunk. We test  four different states of the world 
in terms of the investment cost of DER technology, in this case solar PV and batteries, and find that the 
introduced distortions by the different tariff designs are very sensitive to the costs of DER technology. 
 
Although cost-efficient, there is a critical issue with Ramsey pricing. Namely, it is often perceived as 
unfair as it discriminates users on the basis of their elasticity to prices (see e.g. Neuteleers et al. 
(2017)).10 For example, network tariffs can be designed so that two consumers who share the same 
load profile but have a different willingness to pay for electricity, pay a different share of the residual 
grid costs.11 As mentioned above, the lower the elasticity, the higher the contribution to the residual 
grid costs. In the case of network tariffs, consumers with very low elasticity and thus bearing most of 
the residual costs could be passive consumers with few alternatives to the grid for their electricity 
supply. Besides, to implement Ramsey pricing the price-elasticity of the different consumers needs to 
be estimated, something which is not easy to do. Therefore, strictly applying Ramsey pricing is 
unattainable in practice, leading us to the third principle of distribution network tariff design: fairness.  
                                                           
9 Usually the duration of the regulatory period lies between 3 and 8 years. 
10 It must be added that unfair does not does imply unlawful.  
11 The same load profile means that they consume the same amount of electricity at the same time. 
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1.2.3 Fairness 
The main reason fairness is a principle of network pricing and not of, for example, the pricing of your 
sunglasses is the fact that network charges constitute a significant chunk of the cost of electricity which 
is considered a basic service to which everybody should have access. The notion of fairness is broad 
and needs more explanation. In this text, fairness encompasses distributional issues (inflexibility, 
affordability and non-discrimination), transparency (simple and predictable) and last but not least, 
graduality.12 In what follows, we describe these concepts one by one. Then we move on to the practical 
implication for network tariff design. Inevitably, there will be a trade-off between fairness and cost-
efficiency when designing tariffs. Distribution network tariffs are in that sense no different to any other 
practical pricing system for basic needs. 
 
Regarding inflexibility, is using electricity at a certain time always a real choice? Not really, some 
electricity usage is rather inflexible. In that context, Bunzl (2010) uses the example of a hospital 
emergency room. It is not considered fair to charge higher network tariffs, even though cost-reflective, 
at times when consumers do not have a real choice other than consuming electricity. 
 
In addition to the fact that some electricity usage is rather inflexible, there is also an issue with 
affordability. As mentioned, electricity is considered as a basic need. Some households simply cannot 
afford to pay the ‘real price’ of their electricity usage. It would be deemed unacceptable to cut these 
consumers off. It could be argued that it is not unreasonable to include a ‘usage tag’ for different 
needs: basic needs such as heating versus luxury needs such as the charging of your electric car. Such 
a pricing scheme is however not cost-efficient as different consumers would see a different price for a 
commodity with possibly the same cost. Also, such a system would be hard to implement. In some 
cases, it will be opted to supply vulnerable consumers with a cheaper tariff than the ‘real price’. This 
will unavoidably lead to inefficiencies as described in the previous subsection. There are other methods 
to obtain a similar goal in a more efficient manner, e.g. by exposing consumers to the ‘real price’ but 
at the same time offering them a fixed sum as a rebate on their total electricity bill. As such, the 
consumer incentives are not distorted while electricity remains affordable.  
 
Third, non-discriminatory. It is deemed fair that one is charged the same amount for using the same 
goods or service, regardless of the purpose for which it is used or any characterisations of the 
consumers. At first sight, there seems to be a contradiction between having non-discriminatory tariffs 
and affordability. Indeed, when certain consumer classes such as the vulnerable consumers have a 
cheaper network tariff for reasons of affordability, the tariff is indeed discriminatory. However, in some 
contexts, such practice can be regarded as fair.  
 
Furthermore, a tariff should be as simple as possible as most consumers do not want to spend much 
time analysing tariffs. If a tariff is overly complex, despite being cost-efficient, it might take too much 
time for the consumer to understand it properly. Such practices lead to high transaction costs (in 
standard economics terminology) and frustration. When using a service or consuming a good, 
                                                           
12 In this context, fairness is often used as a synonym for public acceptability or equity. These terms do not imply 
exactly the same; equity can be defined as a (moral/ethical) principle, fairness as a perception (of a process or a 
decision) and acceptance as an evaluation (outcome) that someone judges based on his/her subjective and 
selective assessment. These definitions were provided by Eva Schmid. 
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consumers want to know how much this action will end up costing them. Network tariff pricing should 
be predictable. 
 
Finally, this text talks about redesigning tariffs to deal with evolutions at the consumer and network-
side. Redesigning implies that we do not start from scratch: there is a tariff in place, and consumers 
can perceive changes in what they pay for the network (in the extreme case: ‘bill shocks’) as unfair. In 
some cases, (passive) consumers can see their electricity bill increase significantly without changing 
their consumption; others could have invested in DER, e.g. a solar panel, basing their business case 
partly on the network tariff regime in place. Changing the tariff could render their investment, if 
irreversible, loss-making.  Neuteleers et al. (2017) describe that a price increase is acceptable if the 
underlying costs for that product have increased.13 Contrarily, using excess demand (e.g. scarcity 
because of weather conditions) or an increase in monopoly power (e.g. single seller in a particular 
community) to raise prices is perceived as very unfair.  
 
In Schittekatte and Meeus (2018) we demonstrate that with active consumers reacting to the way the 
grid is priced, taking fairness into account when redesigning the distribution network tariff can have a 
cost in terms of cost-efficiency. The proxy used for fairness in the paper is the increase in the network 
charges paid by passive consumers (e.g. consumers who do not have the financial means to invest in 
DER) due to actions of active consumers reacting to the way the network charges are designed; the 
larger the increase, the more unfair a network tariff is perceived. It is shown that results are sensitive 
to the grid cost structure, i.e. whether in a network most of the grid investments still have to be made 
or whether most grid costs are sunk. If the proportion of sunk grid costs is high and the tariff design 
options are limited, it is an almost impossible task for the regulator to recover all grid costs in a cost-
efficient way while limiting the distributional impact at the same time. More creative solutions might 
be needed to achieve such an objective; examples are differentiated fixed charges or specific low-
income programmes. Another option could be to recover the sunk grid costs through general taxation 
instead of the electricity bill as also discussed in the MIT Energy Initiative (2016). 
 
Recently, the academic literature and debate have focused on fairness between active and passive 
domestic consumers. However, other important debates concerning grid cost allocation are also 
gaining momentum: for example, the cost allocation between grid users (residential and 
smaller/larger industrial/commercial businesses) connected to different voltage levels of the 
transmission and the distribution network and, related, the cost allocation between consumption and 
production connected to the same network or even voltage level.  
 
First, the cost allocation between voltage levels. Historically, electricity flowed from the high voltage 
levels all the way down. As a result, it was acceptable that transmission grid users did not pay for 
distribution while distribution grid users paid for transmission too. Also, within the distribution grid 
this cascading practice is applied with domestic grid users paying more than industrial clients 
connected to higher voltage distribution networks, see for example Brandstätt et al. (2015) explaining 
the German cascading principle. To the extent that the direction of the flows is changing, also this 
cascading principle could be challenged from a fairness (and a cost-efficiency) point of view. In some 
                                                           
13 Neuteleers et al. (2017) adds that at the same time, people deem it acceptable that the price stays the same if 
costs decrease. Both refer to the entitlements of the seller: changing costs should not decrease the firm's 
reference profits. 
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cases, for example in Germany in 2012-2013, certain large electricity users, often connected to higher 
voltage levels, were exempted from paying any network charges at all. Very recently the European 
Commission concluded that fully exempting certain large users from these charges was against EU 
State aid rules as it is an unfair advantage over firms in other countries and increases the financial 
burden on other electricity users (European Commission, 2018).  
 
Second, the cost allocation between consumption and production units. In transmission, this 
discussion goes back far in time. Ruester et al. (2012) describe that many countries simply tend to 
socialise transmission costs among consumers and that this is in part due to historical reasons.14 Only 
a few countries applied (non-significant) network charges to generation, a so-called G-component. For 
more recent data on the transmission network charges, please consult ENTSO-E (2017a) or Sections 
3.3 and 3.4 of the report by Glachant et al. (2017). In distribution networks, only since recently 
significant (mostly renewable) generation capacity is being connected to the network where before 
the large majority of grid users were solely consuming electricity. Also, prosumers, grid users 
withdrawing electricity at times while injecting electricity at other times, and large storage facilities 
become more common distribution grid users. The advent of these new players further complicates 
cost allocation between consumption and production. In this regard the principle of ‘symmetrical 
network charges’ as brought forward by Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2017) is relevant. What is meant with 
symmetrical tariffs is that an electricity injection in the network at a given time and place should be 
compensated at the same rate that is charged for withdrawal at the same time and place. This is an 
important guiding principle, and we expect this discussion to become a topic for future research. 
 The current challenge 
Until recently, consumers connected to the distribution network were not able to react strongly to 
price signals; therefore, there was not much gain to be made from using cost-reflective tariffs. The fact 
that volumetric charges are only slightly cost-reflective was less of an issue. The distribution network 
tariff had a rather allocative objective, recuperating all the network costs in an acceptable way, instead 
of ‘guiding’ consumers to efficient grid behaviour. Also, volumetric distribution network charges were 
deemed fair as high-usage and thus higher network contributions correlated rather well with more 
affluent consumers. Further, such tariffs are predictable, simple and most meters were only capable 
of measuring the cumulated consumed volume thus making more advanced tariffs hard to implement.  
 
However, times are changing and technological evolutions at the consumer-side are challenging the 
use of volumetric network charges. Specifically, volumetric charges with net-metering, implying that a 
consumer will be charged for the net consumption from the grid over a certain period (e.g. month), 
are deemed inadequate with the massive deployment of solar PV. 
 
To give an illustration of the issue: a consumer consumes 300 kWh a month in her house and has a 
solar panel installed which generates 200 kWh in that month. The electricity consumption in the house 
and the generation by the PV panel will not always coincide, but the consumer will have a net 
consumption from the grid that month of 100 kWh for which she will pay network charges. Thus by 
                                                           
14 Ruester et al. (2012) explain that in the past, when transmission was still part of national vertically integrated 
utilities, transmission costs were in general simply socialised over all consumers since under cost-of-service 
regulation and centralised planning it does not make sense to charge generators anything. 
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installing a PV panel, the consumer has lowered her grid charges to 1/3 of what she would originally 
have paid (100 kWh/300 kWh). However, the consumer still relies on the distribution grid and her peak 
usage in the evening, the main cost driver of the network if coincident with the system peak usage, 
will not change much. Thus, the total grid costs do not lower in proportion to the reduced network 
charges paid by the PV adopter. Actually, this reduction in network charges could make the business 
case for solar PV more attractive, thus, by the way the network charges are designed the adoption of 
this technology could be over-incentivised from a purely economic point of view.  Also, it would mean 
that if cost recovery is respected, other consumers, not having installed solar PV would have to 
contribute more. 
 
Note that support for solar PV or energy efficiency can be justified, but it is considered the better 
practice to provide direct support instead of via network tariffs. CEER (2017a) for instance, refers to 
the Dutch case for the disentanglement of network tariff design and energy efficiency goals. In 2009, 
fixed network charges were introduced for small electricity and gas users replacing volumetric tariffs. 
These charges were based on the connection capacity of a household. The consumer now paid less per 
kWh consumed, but the energy tax (also in €/kWh) was adjusted to compensate for reduced energy 
efficiency incentives. If more direct support for energy efficiency or renewables is politically sensitive, 
which is, for instance, more the case in the US, network tariffs could be used for these purposes 
(Kolokathis et al., 2018). However, this is highly controversial among academics (see e.g. the blog post 
by Davis (2018)). 
 
Besides solar PV, there are also breakthroughs in (stationary) batteries, heat pumps, electric vehicles, 
smart appliances etc. Consumers can monitor their interaction with the grid through smart meters, 
and these new controllable technologies can have not only significant effects on the volumes 
withdrawn from the network (in kWh) but also on the timing of withdrawal or injection, i.e.  the 
network capacity utilised at each moment by a consumer (in kW).  
 
There are empirical studies and pilots which confirm that consumers do react to (distribution) tariffs 
by changing their consumption or investing in PV panels. For example, Faruqui et al. (2017) carry out 
a meta-analysis of the results from 63 pilots containing a total of 337 electricity pricing treatments in 
nine countries located on four continents. They focus on the complete electricity bill, not solely the 
distribution network tariff and show that customers do respond to price signals and that these 
responses are predictable. More specifically, they show that consumers do reduce their peak load in 
response to higher peak to off-peak price ratios. Another interesting piece of research in this regard is 
the paper by Gautier and Jacqmin (2018). In their study, they focus on the differences between the 
distribution network tariffs in place for different municipalities within Wallonia, the Southern region 
of Belgium, and its effect on solar PV adoption. Applying an econometric model, they find that one 
euro cent per kWh of tariffs increase leads to, all else being equal, an increase of around 5% in the 
number of new PV installations. In short, we are just at the beginning of this consumer-centric 
revolution, and we can expect that consumers will be able to react more and more to the way the 
network is priced. Active consumer can create opportunities but also risks regarding cost-efficiency 
and fairness. 
 
• Cost-efficiency: We said that, until recently, there was not much gain to be made from cost-
reflective tariffs as consumers were not able to react strongly to price signals. 
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▪ Opportunity: If an adequate cost-reflective tariff is set, consumers can adjust 
their consumption behaviour so that, for example, costly reinforcement can 
be avoided or postponed. A cost-reflective tariff will result in a benefit for 
active consumers and an overall lower total system cost. 
▪ Risk: wrong network pricing can have more severe consequences in terms of 
cost-efficiency as consumers can react stronger to the way the grid is priced. 
For example, high volumetric network charges with net-metering could over-
reward people installing solar PV and therefore overly incentivise the adoption 
of a technology leading to more of this technology installed than would be 
optimal from a system point of view. 
 
• Fairness: We said that volumetric network charges were perceived as fair as high-usage 
correlated rather well with more affluent consumers. 
▪ Opportunity: If network charges are cost-reflective and consumers react to 
this tariff design, a reduction of the total cost to satisfy the electricity needs 
of all consumers could be realised. These gains could be shared with passive 
consumers thus actually leading to a situation where everyone is better off. 
▪ Risk: If the distribution network tariff is not cost-reflective and distortive, 
consumers can react to the way the tariff is designed and exploit privately-
beneficial opportunities without such actions having any system benefit. Such 
a situation would lead to a fairness issue as other grid users will have to 
contribute more in order to recuperate all grid costs as illustrated by the net-
metering example at the start of this section.  
 
Consumers being able to react to the way the network is priced also has implications regarding the 
third principle we addressed: cost-recovery. Until recently, with volumetric network charges in place 
it was relatively easy to estimate the future consumption and thus to calculate the magnitude of the 
volumetric network charge needed to recover all the costs. With harder-to-forecast use of electricity 
and possibly more advanced network tariffs, the estimation of the tariff which will lead to the 
recuperation of the efficiently incurred grid costs is a more challenging task. Cost-recovery is also 
intertwined with the two other principles. The more consumers can actually reduce or increase the 
network costs due to their change in consumption, whether cost-efficient or not, the harder it becomes 
to determine what grid costs were efficiently incurred and thus to estimate the allowed revenue for 
the DSO. Also, political actions aimed at reducing fairness concerns which could result from an 
inadequate network tariff design could put grid cost recovery in danger. 
 
Now, how can the network tariff be adapted to these changing conditions? It can be said that there 
are three dimensions of distribution network tariff design: 
 
• the what – the structure or format (in €/kWh, €/kW, and/or €/connection); 
• the when – electricity generation and consumption (temporal granularity); 
• the where – electricity generation and consumption (locational granularity).  
 
These three dimensions can be seen as the tools that can be used to construct a tariff. There are many 
possible variations within the tariff structures, and the boundary between the different structures is 
not strict. Below in Table 1, several examples of more simple or advanced tariffs, categorised by tariff 
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structure but with different implementation or temporal granularity are summarised. Please note that 
also combinations (so-called multi-part tariffs) can be opted for. 
 
Table 1: Examples of implementations and different tariff structures with possible different 
temporal granularity 
Volumetric Capacity Fixed 
With net-metering The connection (kVA) Per connection 
Gross withdrawal or bi-directional 
charges 
The max capacity over a period (ex-ante 
determined or ex-post measured) 
Per income of 
household 
Increasing (progressive) or decreasing 
block pricing 
Multiple measured max capacity in 
different periods ≈ Time-of-use pricing  
Per square meters of 
property 
Time-of-use pricing … … 
…  
 
Another innovation in distribution network tariff design are Smart Connection Arrangements (SCA). 
Anaya and Pollitt (2015) explain that an SCA implies that grid users, mainly new connections for 
distributed generation such as a windmill connected to the distribution network, have interruptible 
connections rather than the conventional non-interruptible or firm connections. The idea is that grid 
users with an SCA would have to pay fewer grid charges as they allow the DSO to curtail their 
connection for a pre-determined amount of time. By limiting these connections at times of possible 
network congestion, the DSO can avoid or postpone reinforcement. Thus a win-win situation results. 
Anaya and Pollitt (2015) show that the smart connection option is by far the best option when 
compared with Business as Usual (BAU) connections. Hadush and Meeus (2017) discuss another 
alternative to deal with congestion in distribution grids, namely tradable access rights between TSOs 
and DSOs or other borders in the distribution grid. 
 What is the EU debate about? 
On 30 November 2016, the European Commission presented a new package of measures with the goal 
of providing the legislative framework needed to facilitate the clean energy transition – and thereby 
taking a significant step towards the creation of the Energy Union. This package was called the EU 
Clean Energy Package (CEP), also known as the Winter Package. As expected, distribution network 
tariffs are covered by the CEP. In Article 16(10) of the proposal by the EC for the Regulation on the 
Internal Market for Electricity (IME) it is said that (EC, 2016b):  
 
‘Charges applied by network operators for access to networks, including charges for connection to the 
networks, charges for use of networks, and, where applicable, charges for related network 
reinforcements, shall be transparent, take into account the need for network security and flexibility and 
reflect actual costs incurred insofar as they correspond to those of an efficient and structurally 
comparable network operator and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. In particular, they shall 
be applied in a way which does not discriminate between production connected at the distribution level 
and production connected at the transmission level, either positively or negatively. They shall not 
discriminate against energy storage and shall not create disincentives for participation in demand 
response. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, those charges shall not be distance-related.’15 
                                                           
15 Paragraph 3: ‘Where appropriate, the level of the tariffs applied to producers and/or consumers shall provide 
locational signals at Union level, and take into account the amount of network losses and congestion caused, 
and investment costs for infrastructure.’ 
18 
 
 
Also, the CEP brings new proposals for distribution tariffs harmonisation and links them to the 
transmission tariffs harmonisation process. While the harmonisation of transmission tariffs has been 
debated in the past (see e.g. ECN et al. (2017) and Glachant et al. (2017)), the harmonisation of 
distribution tariffs has not had a similar focus over the last years. The EC argues that harmonising the 
principles for distribution tariffs will help the establishment of a well-functioning internal market and 
limit its cross-border distortions. More precisely, the EC (2016a) states that widely divergent 
distribution tariff regimes may affect the development of the internal market as they affect the 
conditions under which Renewable Energy Sources (RES) or other generation resources can access the 
grid and participate in the national and cross-border energy markets. 
 
In the CEP, the EC proposal for the Regulation on the IME suggested new rules for the harmonisation 
of the distribution tariffs (EC, 2016b). Concretely, in Article 55(1)(k) the harmonisation of distribution 
tariffs is added to the areas to be covered by Network Codes:  
 
Article 55: ‘1. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 63 
concerning the establishment of network codes in the following areas: 
… 
(k) harmonised transmission and distribution tariff structures and connection charges including 
locational signals and inter-transmission system operator compensation rules’; 
…. 
 
Further, for the progressive convergence of transmission and distribution tariff methodologies, Art. 16 
(9) of the EC proposal for the Regulation on the IME states that ACER shall provide a recommendation 
addressed to NRAs within three months of the Regulation entering into force (EC, 2016b). Several 
questions should be addressed in the recommendation such as the ratio of tariffs applied to producers 
and to consumers, temporal and locational signals and the relationship between transmission and 
distribution tariffs. 
 
In the meantime, the Council of the European Union published a provisional position on this proposal 
which forms the basis for the negotiations with the European Parliament (EU Council, 2017). It is 
important to note that in this proposal the adoption of a network code for distribution network tariffs 
has been removed. Plus, it is stated that within three months of entering into force of the Regulation, 
‘the Agency shall provide a best practice report on transmission and distribution tariff methodologies 
while leaving sufficient room to take national specificities into account.’ A best practice report is 
expected to send a weaker signal for harmonisation than recommendations. 
 
Like the Council, not everyone agrees with drafting a network code for the harmonisation of 
distribution network tariffs. CEER (2017b) clearly opposes this, stating: ‘The impact assessment 
published by the Commission (EC, 2016a) does not provide any justification that the benefits of further 
harmonisation of tariffs would outweigh the costs for implementation. We consider that harmonisation 
of both transmission and distribution tariffs at European level could be inefficient and not lead to the 
right outcomes for European consumers. NRAs are best placed to consider the best regulatory choices 
within the European framework. Implementing a “one size fits all” approach risks inefficient incentives 
for network use on a Member State level, particularly with the emergence of more local energy models.’ 
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EDSO, one of the main organisations representing the DSOs in Europe, agrees with CEER on this point 
by stating: ‘Network and geographical characteristics are very diverse throughout Europe, leading to 
diverging best practices in terms of network tariffs structures. Network codes do not seem to be the 
right tool to efficiently enhance distribution tariff structures at European level.’ 
 
Another stakeholder, REScoop (2017), representing  energy communities in Europe, provides a more 
nuanced view about the harmonisation of distribution grid tariff by saying: ‘the Electricity Directive 
should provide national regulators with a duty to ensure that network tariffs for DER are calculated 
according to an objective and transparent long-term cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that takes into account 
the wide range of benefits of DER to the energy system, society and the environment. To ensure a 
holistic approach towards such an analysis, the Electricity Directive must provide a definition of DER.’ 
Finally, BEUC (2017) the consumer voice in Europe, recommends the following: ‘Network tariffs should 
better reflect real use of the grid. They should be redesigned in order to reward flexibility and trigger 
contribution of ancillary services by consumers who engage in self-generation or demand-side 
flexibility. However, the redesign of network tariffs must not unduly increase the financial burden of 
households with a low level of electricity consumption or households living in remote areas.’ 
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2. Network Codes 
 Setting the scene: this is just the beginning 
The Third Energy Package (Regulation (EC) 714/2009) has led to the development of eight network 
codes and guidelines which are split up into three groups: the grid connection codes (RfG NC, DCC NC 
and HVDC NC), the market guidelines (CACM GL, FCA GL and EB GL) and the system operation codes 
(SO GL and ER NC). All codes and guidelines entered into force by 2017 at the latest, after a 4-year co-
creation process by the European Network of Transmission System Operator for Electricity (ENTSO-E), 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the European Commission (EC) and many 
other stakeholders from across the electricity sector. These codes and guidelines are a detailed set of 
rules pushing for the harmonisation (of previously nationally oriented) electricity markets and 
regulations. 
 
However, just because the codes and guidelines have entered into force does not mean that all the 
work is done. In many articles of the guidelines (CACM GL, FCA GL, EB GL and SO GL) principles are 
described that serve as foundations for terms, conditions and methodologies (TCM) which will be 
developed according to predefined deadlines. The final form of the TCMs is not set in stone and will 
continue to be discussed in the coming years when nearing the deadlines. Methodologies are mostly 
developed at Pan-European scale or Regional scale by Transmission System Operators (TSOs) or 
Nominated Electricity Market Operators (NEMOs).16 Usually, a public consultation is held before the 
methodology is submitted to the relevant National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to allow for 
stakeholder involvement. The relevant NRAs can approve, ask to amend or reject the methodology. If 
the NRAs do not reach an internal agreement on whether to approve the methodology, the decision 
is handed over to ACER. An overview of the methodologies submitted before May 2017 is displayed in 
Figure 7. ENTSO-E’s tasks, also shown in the figure, are mostly related to monitoring, stakeholder 
involvement and reporting. 
 
 
Figure 7: Status of the methodologies within the network codes and guidelines in May 2017 (ENTSO-
E, 2017b) 
                                                           
16 NEMOs are power exchanges certified to organise cross-zonal electricity trade. 
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There is a different implementation process in place for connection codes (RfG NC, DCC and HVDC NC). 
In these cases, the Member States have an obligation to implement the codes no later than three years 
after their entry into force. Within this timeframe, the relevant system operators or TSOs have two 
years to define and submit proposals for national specifications regarding the so-called non-exhaustive 
requirements as shown in Figure 8. These proposals are submitted for approval to the relevant NRAs 
(ENTSO-E, 2018). Finally, exactly three years after the entry into force and onwards, all impacted grid 
users have to comply with the Regulations.17 
 
Figure 8: Timeline for the Requirement for Generators Network Code (RfG NC) and Demand 
Connection Network Code (DCC NC) 
Furthermore, these eight existing network codes and guidelines are the first of their kind, and it is very 
probable that there are many more codes and guidelines to come. In its EU Clean Energy Package (CEP) 
issued in November 2016, the EC proposed a recast of Regulation (EC) 714/2009. In Article 55 of the 
recast of the Regulation on the Internal Market for Electricity (IME) a list of areas concerning the 
establishment of (new) network codes is given (EC, 2016b). The list is shown below. The underlined 
text refers to newly added text or areas when compared to the Third Energy Package. It should be 
noted that the European Council in their position removed distribution tariff structures and connection 
charges in point (k) and fully removed points (n) and (p) from the list of areas for network codes. The 
Council also amended the text of several other areas to make the exact topics covered within each 
area more explicit (EU Council, 2017).  
 
Art. 55(1) of the Regulation on the IME as in the proposal by the EC: 
 ‘The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 63 concerning the 
establishment of network codes in the following areas: 
 
(a) network security and reliability rules including rules for technical transmission reserve capacity for 
operational network security; 
(b) network connection rules; 
(c) third-party access rules; 
(d) data exchange and settlement rules; 
                                                           
17 The grids users subject to the connection codes are new power-generating modules, new demand facilities or 
new HVDC connections. ‘New’ means that the grid user has concluded the final and binding contract for the 
purchase of the main elements of its power-generating modules, demand facility or HVDC connection later than 
two years after the entry into force of the Regulation. Exceptionally, also ‘existing’ power-generating modules, 
demand facilities or HVDC connections can be asked to comply with the connection codes by the relevant NRA 
or the Member State. Such a request would be based on the evolution of system requirements and a full cost-
benefit analysis, or where there has been substantial modernisation of those facilities. For more information 
about the scope the grid connection codes please see Art. 3 and 4 of the RfG NC, Art. 2 and 3 of the DCC and Art. 
3 and 4 of the HVDC NC. 
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(e) interoperability rules; 
(f) operational procedures in an emergency; 
(g) capacity-allocation and congestion-management rules including curtailment of generation and 
redispatch of generation and demand; 
(h) rules for trading related to technical and operational provision of network access services and 
system balancing; 
(i) transparency rules; 
(j) balancing rules including network-related reserve power rules; 
(k) rules regarding harmonised transmission and distribution tariff structures and connection charges 
including locational signals and inter-transmission system operator compensation rules; 
(l) energy efficiency regarding electricity networks; 
(m) rules for non-discriminatory, transparent provision of non-frequency ancillary services, including 
steady state voltage control, inertia, fast reactive current injection, black-start capability; 
(n) demand response, including aggregation, energy storage, and demand curtailment rules; 
(o) cyber security rules; and 
(p) rules concerning regional operational centres.’ 
 
Additionally, the CEP includes provisions that would modify the governance of the network codes and 
guidelines. In detail, the CEP provisions attempt to alter the amendment process for existing network 
codes/guidelines, and the drafting process for newly introduced network codes.18   
 
This text aims to demonstrate that while network codes and guidelines imply certain obligations for all 
relevant parties, they also create opportunities. We illustrate this on the basis of a discussion regarding 
the balancing mechanism which is impacted by the Electricity Balancing (EB GL) and the System 
Operation Guideline (SO GL). Both guidelines entered into force recently, respectively on 18 December 
2017 and on 14 September 2017. The first drafts of the methodologies comprised within these 
guidelines are being discussed at the moment. The final implementation of all that is covered in these 
guidelines is expected to take until 2023 or later (ENTSO-E, 2017c). 
 
In this text, we first look at balance responsibility, which is an obligation that could imply a cost for 
many grid users. However, depending on the workings of the different markets preceding the 
balancing mechanism and the specific design of the imbalance settlement mechanism, this cost can be 
better controlled and possibly even turned into a revenue opportunity. Also, we highlight what the 
network codes and guidelines and the CEP state about who should be balance responsible. Second, we 
focus on the ‘supply side’ of the balancing mechanism. More specifically, we discuss how the market 
design rules governing the balancing markets affect not only the efficiency of the balancing mechanism 
but also the possibility for different players to participate in these markets. Finally, we take a look at 
                                                           
18 For more details on the development and amendment process of network codes as proposed in CEP, please 
consult a recording of the FSR online debate on this topic: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rjtX0RXc83Y&t=2533s 
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the total balancing costs in different Member States. We discuss the recuperation of these costs and 
the relative importance of balancing capacity (reservation) versus balancing energy (activation) costs. 
 Obligations in balancing: balance responsibility 
In this section, we will first provide a more detailed explanation of imbalances, imbalance prices and 
the imbalance settlement. While describing the process of trading in the day-ahead market up to the 
imbalance settlement, we show that choices in market design parameters can impact the costs (or 
possibly revenues) of Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs). A BRP is defined as a market participant or 
its chosen representative that is responsible for its imbalances. We finish this section by summarising 
what is said in the existing network codes and guidelines and the CEP regarding who should be balance 
responsible. 
2.2.1 From trading to imbalance settlement: process and market design parameters 
In a power system, generation needs to equal load at every point in time. If at a certain point in time, 
the load is higher than electricity generated (or vice-versa), the frequency of a system will start to drop 
(rise). It is undesirable that the frequency deviates from its set point, 50 Hz in Europe or 60 Hz in the 
US, because protection systems from load and generation which detect such deviation in frequency 
will disconnect from the central grid to avoid damage to the devices. Such actions will lead to a further 
frequency drop or rise and can end up in a cascade failure and black-out.  
 
Electricity markets are designed to deal with this particularity. Different types of electricity markets 
are arranged in sequential order, starting years before the actual delivery and ending after the actual 
delivery, in which market participants can trade and sell depending on their possibly changing offers 
or needs. The balancing market comes at the last step to ensure that generation equals demand. The 
balancing market is operated by the TSO as it is the TSO who is responsible for ensuring the system is 
in balance per control area.19 If an imbalance occurs very near to real-time, the TSO has to instruct 
resources, termed Balancing Service Providers (BSPs), to reduce or raise their generation or load in 
order to restore the system balance.  
 
Figure 9 provides an example of what is meant by an imbalance. The viewpoint of a (net) electricity 
buyer is illustrated; the same principles apply for a (net) electricity seller. Before explaining the figure, 
we introduce the Imbalance Settlement Period (ISP). The ISP is the time unit for which BRPs’ imbalance 
is calculated. The length of the ISP itself is an important parameter. A shorter ISP more correctly 
allocates the cost of balancing, i.e. it is possible to better reflect the costs of fast-changing flexible 
balancing actions. Also, a shorter ISP helps the TSO to control the system balance; this is of particular 
importance with more volatile generation and consumption. However, the longer the ISP, the more 
the imbalance volume is limited for the BRP as short-term fluctuations of the BRPs’ imbalances are 
netted out. In Art. 53, the EB GL states that by three years after the entry into force (18 December 
                                                           
19 A control area can be defined as a coherent part of the interconnected system, operated by a single TSO. A 
control area should not be confused with a bidding zone. A bidding zone is defined as the largest geographical 
area over which market participants can trade electricity without capacity allocation. For example, in Belgium, 
the control area operated by Elia equals the bidding zone. This is the case in a majority of European countries, 
e.g. France, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, but is not a standard rule. For example, in Germany there are 
4 control areas, operated by TenneT Germany, 50Hz, Amprion and TransnetBW but only one bidding zone 
(together with Austria and Luxembourg). Alternatively, in Sweden there is one control area operated by Svenska 
Kraftnät but there are 4 bidding zones. 
24 
 
2020), all TSOs shall apply the imbalance settlement period of 15 minutes. An exemption is possible 
per synchronous area if the TSOs of that synchronous area can justify an alternative duration and this 
exemption is approved by the NRAs. Alternatively, also all NRAs of a synchronous area can apply for 
an exemption at their own initiative.20 In both cases, every three years it needs to show ACER that the 
benefits of having an unharmonised ISP outweigh the costs.21 For simplicity, in Figure 9 the ISP is 
assumed to be one hour. 
 
 
Figure 9: The sequence of electricity markets and the calculation of an imbalance (example for a 
buyer of electricity). Source: FSR (2018) 
An example of a sequence of transactions of an electricity buyer is shown in Figure 9. In this example, 
we are focusing on the energy block for tomorrow between 8 and 9 am. When looking at Figure 9 
chronologically, it can be seen that the market participant first buys a certain volume of electricity in 
the day-ahead market (DAM) for tomorrow between 8 and 9 am. Then, a couple of hours before 8 am, 
the market participant realises that she will need more electricity during that time-block and she buys 
an additional volume in the intraday market (IDM). An important parameter prerequisite for being able 
to control ones’ imbalance volume is the possibility to trade in a liquid intraday market.22 If the 
intraday market does not function well, BRPs will not be able to hedge themselves adequately against 
real-time imbalances. Also product design of the intraday market matters, namely it is important that 
the products traded in the intraday should have at least the same temporal granularity as the ISP. In 
the example in Figure 9, the granularity of the products in the DAM and IDM equal the ISP, namely one 
hour. But, imagine an ISP of 15 minutes while there are only hourly products being bought and sold in 
the intraday market. It will become costlier for a market participant to hedge a crucial 15 minutes as 
she will have to buy or sell a full hour block of energy to do so. In a recent paper, Ocker and Ehrhart 
                                                           
20 There are 5 synchronous areas in Europe: Continental Europe, the Nordics, the Baltics, the UK and Ireland. 
21 The CEP proposal by the EC states that the imbalance settlement period shall be 15 minutes in all control areas 
by 1 January 2025 without exemptions (Regulation on IME, Art. 7(4)). The Council’s proposal adjusts this Article 
by stating that by 1 January 2021, the imbalance settlement period shall be 15 minutes in all scheduling areas 
and the same exemptions as in the EB GL Art 53 hold. 
22 On the one hand, one could argue that BRPs need a liquid intraday market in order to be able to adjust their 
positions. On the other hand, one could also argue that making more grid users balance responsible will help to 
make the intraday market more liquid. 
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(2017) argue that the introduction of an intraday auction with 15-minute products in Germany in 2014 
helped to allow more precise scheduling of variable RES and other generation technologies and led to 
a significant reduction in overall balancing costs. In that regard, the EC proposal for the Regulation on 
the IME states in Art. 7(2) that market operators shall provide market participants with the opportunity 
to trade in energy in time intervals at least as short as the imbalance settlement period in both day-
ahead and intraday markets.23 
 
Finally, when the intraday market closes, the market participant has to notify the TSO about his 
allocated volume (contractual position) which is, in this case, the sum of the electricity bought in the 
DAM and IDM. The time when the intraday market closes is called the gate closure time and is the 
moment when trade between market participants is no longer possible, and the TSO takes over 
(typically one hour up to one minute before real-time). The intraday gate-closure time is an important 
parameter. The closer to real-time the intraday gate closure takes place, the better the final forecast 
for generation and consumption. The intraday gate closure time is a trade-off between on one hand, 
the maximisation of market participants' opportunities for adjusting their balances by trading in the 
intraday market time-frame as close as possible to real-time, and on the other hand, providing TSOs 
and market participants with sufficient time for their scheduling and balancing processes in relation to 
network and operational security. The Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management Guideline 
(CACM GL), covering the workings of the DAM and IDM and their integration, states in Art. 59(3) that 
the intraday cross-zonal gate closure shall be at most one hour before the start of the relevant market 
time unit. It should be noted that the gate closure for intraday trade within a bidding zone can be 
different than the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time. 
 
Finally, in real-time, the market participant will consume more or less than the allocated volume as it 
is hard to predict accurately the actual consumption. The imbalance, the net difference between the 
allocated volume and the actual physical consumption/generation of the BRPs between 8 and 9am, 
can be calculated. Two cases can occur: 
 
• In case 1, the market participant bought more electricity than she actually consumed during 
the hour. In that case, the market participant has a positive imbalance or is ‘long’. 
 
• In case 2, the market participant consumed more electricity during the hour than she actually 
bought. In that case, the market participant has a negative imbalance or is ‘short’. 
 
Ideally, through the imbalance settlement, the balancing cost is reflected to the imbalanced BRPs. In 
this respect, the imbalance settlement rule is an important design parameter.  Broadly speaking, there 
are two options for the imbalance settlement rule: dual pricing and single pricing. Under dual pricing, 
when the individual imbalance of a BRP is in the same direction of the system imbalance, thus the 
imbalance is aggravating the system imbalance, the imbalance settlement is linked to the cost of 
balancing energy. However, the reverse price, meaning the price a BRP sees when his individual 
imbalance is in the opposite direction of the system imbalance and its imbalance is thus helping to 
restore the system balance, is often linked or capped by a reference or day-ahead market price. This 
means that the incentive to help the system is limited under dual pricing. Contrarily, under single 
                                                           
23 This would imply that also 15-minute products are foreseen to be traded in the day-ahead market while 
currently only hourly products are available. 
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pricing, the BRP does receive the imbalance price linked to the cost of balancing energy when the 
individual imbalance of the BRP is helping to restore the system imbalance.24 Thus, single pricing gives 
an incentive for BRPs to support the system balance, while with dual pricing the idea is rather to make 
sure that BRPs balance their own positions, independently of the system’s state. 
 
Single pricing is generally accepted as the superior method in the academic literature. An important 
argument is that dual imbalance pricing discriminates against smaller players. Namely, larger players 
can aggregate imbalances within a portfolio to lower their total balancing costs under dual pricing 
(Neuhoff et al., 2015). This is not possible with single pricing. Furthermore, the dual price imbalance 
design is reputed to be less cost-reflective than the single price design (Newbery, 2006). Lastly, imagine 
a market party with random uncontrollable imbalances fluctuating around zero, which are completely 
uncorrelated with the system imbalance and with the system imbalance also being random and 
fluctuating around zero. In that case, under single pricing, the total imbalance cost of that BRP will net 
out, while this is not the case under dual pricing in which the total imbalance cost will be positive. 
Actually, single pricing can create a revenue opportunity for BRPs as they could engage in passive 
balancing, i.e. having an imbalance in the opposite direction of the system imbalance.  
 
However, passive balancing is only feasible if close to real-time information is available about the 
system balancing state as this is key information for BRPs to anticipate the system state. Fernandes et 
al. (2016) explain that the Netherlands is an example of best-practice as all information regarding 
activated reserve volumes and prices is published two minutes after reserve activation. They add that 
the length of the ISP matters in this respect as a shorter ISP facilitates the anticipation of the final 
system balancing state. This can be explained by the fact that over longer settlement periods it is more 
likely that both upward and downward reserves are activated. There are also arguments in favour of 
dual pricing over single pricing. Brijs et al. (2017) note that speculation of BRPs about the direction of 
the system imbalance would be avoided with dual pricing. In that same line, if BRPs do not passively 
balance themselves, it would be easier for the TSO to estimate real-time system imbalances and 
anticipate power flows. This is of particular importance when internal grid congestion is a recurring 
issue.  
 
Regarding this rule, the network codes are intended to drive harmonisation. Art. 52(2) of the EB GL is 
relevant. It states that single pricing should be applied. However, a TSO may propose to the NRA to 
apply dual pricing under certain conditions and with the necessary justification. More precisely: 
 
‘By one year after entry into force of this Regulation, all TSOs shall develop a proposal to further specify 
and harmonize at least: 
…. 
(c) the use of single imbalance pricing for all imbalances pursuant to Article 55, which defines a single 
price for positive imbalances and negative imbalances for each imbalance price area within an 
imbalance settlement period; and 
 
(d) the definition of conditions and methodology for applying dual imbalance pricing for all imbalances 
                                                           
24 Typically, in case the system is short, the imbalance price will be higher than the price that could be obtained 
in preceding markets. Vice-versa for when the system is long. 
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pursuant to Article 55, which defines one price for positive imbalances and one price for negative 
imbalances for each imbalance price area within an imbalance settlement period, encompassing: 
 
(i) conditions on when a TSO may propose to its relevant regulatory authority in accordance 
with Article 37 of Directive 2009/72/EC the application of dual pricing and which justification 
must be provided; 
 
(ii) the methodology for applying dual pricing.’ 
 
Generally, the larger a system imbalance during a particular ISP, the larger the spread between the 
day-ahead (or intraday) price and the imbalance settlement. If BSPs are paid the marginal price for 
being activated by the TSO and this price is reflected by the imbalance settlement, more correct signals 
will be sent to BRPs about the costs or value of their imbalances. Marginal pricing is not always applied 
today, instead, often the imbalance price is computed as the average cost of balancing actions. There 
are also ‘hybrid solutions’, as for example is done in Great Britain (GB). More specifically, in GB the 
imbalance price is equal to the average price of the most expensive X MWh of balancing purchases 
during a settlement period. With X being historically 500 MWh but converging to 1 MWh in the winter 
of 2018.25  
2.2.2 Balance responsibility in the Network Codes and Guidelines 
None of the electricity network codes and guidelines explicitly mention who should be balance 
responsible under which conditions. However, in the EB GL Art. 18(6) it is stated that no later than six 
months after the EB GL enters into force (18 June 2018) a proposal regarding the terms and conditions 
for BRPs should be submitted. The relevant TSO(s) shall submit a proposal for all scheduling areas of 
the Member State to the NRA. It is interesting to note that this proposal shall contain the definition of 
balance responsibility for each connection (in a way that avoids any gaps or overlaps in the balance 
responsibility of different market participants providing services to that connection). It is also 
important to add that EB GL Art. 18(4.d) requires that each balancing energy bid from a BSP is assigned 
to one or more BRPs to enable the calculation of an imbalance adjustment. 
2.2.3 Balance responsibility in the CEP proposal 
On balance responsibility, Art. 4(1) of the Regulation on the IME as proposed by the EC indicates in its 
first paragraph that ‘all market participants shall aim for system balance and shall be financially 
responsible for imbalances they cause in the system. They shall either be balance responsible parties or 
delegate their responsibility to a balance responsible party of their choice.’  
 
Art. 4(2) of the same recast specifies that Member States may provide derogation from balance 
responsibility and allow a grandfathering clause for some existing installation, more precisely: 
 
(a) demonstration projects; 
 
(b) generating installations using renewable energy sources or high-efficiency cogeneration with an 
installed electricity capacity of less than 500 kW;26 
                                                           
25 For more information about the GB practice, please see Box 7 in Meeus and Schittekatte (2018). 
26 The Council proposal lowers this capacity to 250 kW. 
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(c) installations benefitting from support approved by the Commission under Union State aid rules 
pursuant to Articles 107 to 109 TFEU27, and commissioned prior to [OP: entry into force]. Member States 
may, subject to Union state aid rules, incentivize market participants which are fully or partly exempted 
from balancing responsibility to accept full balancing responsibility against appropriate compensation. 
 
The third paragraph of Art. 4 adds that from 1 January 2026, the point (b) of paragraph 2 shall apply 
only to generating installations using renewable energy sources or high-efficiency cogeneration with 
an installed electricity capacity of less than 250 kW28 according to the point 3 of the same article. 
 
The proposal by the Council adds to Article 4(2) that when a Member State chooses to provide a 
derogation according to Article 4(2), they need to ensure that the financial responsibilities of 
imbalances are fulfilled by another party. For a full overview of the different positions of the EC, Council 
and European Parliament (EP) regarding balance responsibility, please consult the presentation by the 
EC (2018). 
 Opportunities in balancing: an additional revenue stream 
While in the previous section we described the ‘demand side’ of the balancing mechanism, in this 
section we will describe the ‘supply side’. More specifically, we explain how BSPs can offer balancing 
capacity and energy in markets operated by the TSO. This section is structured as follows. First, we 
explain how the physical process of system balancing works, while also covering why there are 
different types of balancing resources. Second, we introduce the two (interrelated) balancing markets: 
the balancing capacity and balancing energy market. Finally, we discuss important market design 
parameters of these markets. 
2.3.1 How balancing works: the different categories of reserves 
Figure 10 shows how the frequency of a system is restored after a frequency deviation. It should be 
noted that the activation process shown in this figure is the typical activation process for a TSO with a 
reactive approach to the activation of balancing energy.29 It can be seen that for this purpose different 
types of reserves are activated sequentially. These different types of reserves meet different 
operational needs; in practical terms, they differ mainly in response time and maximum duration of 
delivery. The types of reserves which can be grouped under three processes are summarised in Table 
2, the nomenclature as used in the SO GL is applied. Previously, different denominations existed. To 
clarify, these older denominations are also added. 
 
                                                           
27 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
28 The Council proposal lowers this capacity to 150 kW. 
29 For further explanation of this concept, please see Section 6.4 of Meeus and Schittekatte (2018) or the paper 
by Haberg and Doorman (2016). 
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Figure 10: A frequency drop and the reserve activation structure (Elia and TenneT, 2014)  
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Table 2: Terminology for reserve products (based on E-Bridge and IAEW (2016)) 
Figure 10 shows the occurrence of a frequency drop; a frequency drop is caused due to a deficit of 
energy in the system, i.e. there is more consumption or less generation than scheduled in real-time. 
Vice-versa, the frequency would rise. The first source limiting the frequency drop is inertia. Inertia is 
not depicted in Figure 10. Inertia is an inherent physical property of, for example, turbines.30 Inertia 
slows down a frequency drop/spike immediately after a mismatch between supply and demand and 
does not need any control signal. In other words, with little inertia a small difference in supply and 
demand can cause a very steep frequency drop/spike. Inertia was always valuable for the system, but 
it was mostly provided for free as it was abundant in the recent past. However, due to the penetration 
of DER, there are increasingly times when not many thermal power plants are connected. 
Consequently, during those moments system inertia and thus reliability decreases. This is a particular 
concern for smaller or isolated synchronous systems. To address this issue, there are also methods 
being developed to obtain inertia from sources other than thermal power plants, so-called ‘synthetic 
inertia provision’.31 In the Art. 21(2.a) of the RfG NC is stated that the relevant TSOs has the right to 
require synthetic inertia provision from larger power park modules (type C or D).32  
 
System inertia slows down the drop/rise in frequency but does not stop the drop/rise. Therefore, 
almost immediately from the moment the frequency drops/spikes, Frequency Containment Reserves 
(FCR) are activated to stabilise or ‘contain’ the drop/spike. FCR are the fastest type of reserves and are 
                                                           
30 In Art. 2 (33) of the RfG NC inertia is defined as ‘the property of a rotating rigid body, such as the rotor of an 
alternator, such that it maintains its state of uniform rotational motion and angular momentum unless an external 
torque is applied ‘. In the same network code also the requirements regarding inertia provision are covered. 
31 in the RfG NC is stated that TSOs can require synthetic inertia provision from larger power park modules (type 
C or D), see Art. 21(2.a). For more information, see also the short video by the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) explaining concepts as frequency and inertia: https://vimeopro.com/nerclearning/erstf-
1/video/146105419  
32 The RfG NC provides maximum thresholds for the classification of power-generating modules in four 
categories, A to D (small to large). These maximum thresholds differ per synchronous area. The final thresholds 
used for the classification are decided on a Member State level (see Art. 5 of the RfG NC). 
30 
 
operated using a joint process involving all TSOs of the synchronous area. Within a couple of minutes 
after the activation of FCR, the Frequency Restoration Process (FRP) starts. First, automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserves (aFRR) and later manual Frequency Restoration Reserves (mFRR) are activated. 
aFRR are reserves activated automatically by a controller operated by the TSO, mFRR are activated 
upon a specific manual request from the TSO. The FRP aims to restore the frequency to its nominal 
value. Finally, after about 15 minutes or more, Replacement Reserves (RR), the slowest type of 
reserves, can be activated to support or replace FRR. Not all systems have a Reserve Replacement 
Process (RRP) in place, and this process is not made mandatory by the SO GL.  
 
Although the same categories of reserve products exist in the EU, the exact product definition and the 
methodologies used for sizing or activation can still differ strongly from one control area to another. 
The EB GL and the SO GL intend to harmonise most elements of the balancing mechanism which also 
paves the way for more cross-zonal exchange of balancing resources.  
2.3.2 The balancing markets 
It can be said that two (interrelated) ‘balancing markets’ exist: balancing capacity markets and 
balancing energy markets. In this subsection, first, the balancing capacity market is introduced. After, 
the same is done for the balancing energy market. Then a (non-exhaustive) list of important market 
design parameters of these markets is discussed. Market design could affect the costs for balancing 
the system and also the opportunities for different players to generate revenues in these markets.  
Balancing capacity market 
In the balancing capacity markets, BSPs are paid in order to reserve capacity for the duration of the 
contract. This implies that a BSP cannot commit this capacity to other markets (such as the DAM or 
IDM). Reserved balancing capacity is expected to be available in real-time, i.e. they have to bid in real-
time balancing energy markets. If not, they will have to pay a fine. This does not mean that BSPs, who 
sold balancing capacity, will finally have to deliver the balancing energy. The activation of balancing 
energy only occurs when in real-time the balancing energy bid is accepted by the TSO. The idea behind 
reserving balancing capacity for the different reserve types is to make sure that there is always an 
adequate safety margin, i.e. enough available back-up balancing resources to deal with unexpected 
events.  
 
In the balancing capacity market, BSPs offer upward and/or downward balancing capacity. Upward 
balancing capacity means that a BSP will reserve a margin to inject balancing energy into the system 
when activated. Upwards balancing energy is needed when there is less electricity supply than demand 
(energy deficit). Vice-versa for downward balancing capacity. Balancing capacity markets can take 
place from months ahead to one day before the actual time of (possible) delivery of the balancing 
energy. The timing may differ per type of reserve. In general, there are different markets for the 
different types of reserves (FCR, aFRR, mFRR and possibly RR). Also, there are possibly different 
products per type of reserve. The demand for reserves procured in the balancing capacity market is 
determined in the reserve sizing process, i.e. an analysis conducted by the TSO (coordinated or not 
with other TSOs) to estimate the necessary reserves of each balancing product in real-time. 
Balancing energy market 
Real-time system imbalances drive the demand for the activation of balancing energy.  If the system 
imbalance is negative, meaning a deficit of electricity in the system, upward balancing energy is 
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activated by the TSO to restore the balance. Conversely, if the system imbalance is positive, meaning 
a surplus of electricity in the system, downward balancing energy is activated by the TSO. Upward and 
downward balancing energy bids for aFRR, mFRR and RR have to be submitted before the balancing 
energy gate closure time. In most cases the activation of FCR is not remunerated, only its reservation 
is paid. Van den Bergh et al. (2018) explain that when FCR is symmetric (offering jointly fast upwards 
and downward energy), its activation is generally not remunerated because (short and fast) activations 
in both directions would eventually cancel out the payments.  
 
BSPs contracted in the balancing capacity market are expected to offer balancing energy for their 
contract duration. It is important to note that the price of the balancing energy bid should not be 
predetermined in the contract of balancing capacity (EB GL, Art. 16(6)). Exceptionally, for specific 
balancing energy products, it is possible to request that this rule is not applied. Brunekreeft (2015) 
remarks that if a bid is selected on the balancing capacity market and its bidder is thus obliged to bid 
in the balancing energy market, the balancing energy market  bid can be very high in order to avoid 
commitment. This way the relevant bidder still earns a balancing capacity payment.33  Other BSPs, 
without contracted balancing capacity, may also bid in the balancing energy market. Finally, if justified, 
TSOs have the right to compel BSPs to offer their resources as balancing energy when these resources 
are not committed in other preceding markets (EB GL, Art. 18(7)). 
Key market design parameters of balancing markets 
The design of balancing products and the way that balancing markets are organised can enable the 
participation of new players or hamper their access to these markets. However, before being able to 
participate in the balancing markets, balancing resources need to go through a prequalification 
process. Most new players, such as RES or demand response are not connected to the transmission 
network but instead to the distribution network. In that respect, in Art. 182(4) of the SO GL it is 
specified that ‘during the prequalification of a reserve providing unit or group connected to its 
distribution system, each reserve connecting DSO and each intermediate DSO, in cooperation with the 
TSO, shall have the right to set limits to or exclude the delivery of active power reserves located in its 
distribution system, based on technical reasons such as the geographical location of the reserve 
providing units and reserve providing groups.’ Additionally, in the same article in paragraph 5 it is 
stated that ‘each reserve connecting DSO and each intermediate DSO shall have the right, in 
cooperation with the TSO, to set, before the activation of reserves, temporary limits to the delivery of 
active power reserves located in its distribution system.’   
 
When being qualified for participating in the balancing markets, the design of the balancing products 
is of importance. An interesting report in that regard is the (yearly) monitoring report on explicit 
demand response in Europe by SEDC (2017).34 Examples of crucial balancing product characteristics 
are: 
 
• Minimum bid size: In the DAM and IDM this parameter is not considered as restrictive as it is 
set low enough (Agora, 2016). However, in balancing markets, limits are often a lot higher, e.g. 
for aFRR, the minimum bid size ranged from more than 5 MW in Norway to 1 MW in Belgium 
in 2016. A lower minimum bid size lowers the entry barriers for new players in the balancing 
                                                           
33 Such market behaviour is rather unlikely although not impossible in practice. 
34 Recently the SEDC, which stood for the Smart Energy Demand Coalition, changed its name to SmartEn. 
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market. It should be added that higher minimum volume requirements can be compensated 
for if aggregation is allowed. 
 
• Contract period: if a BSP’s balancing capacity offer is accepted, the BSP is obliged to offer (a 
certain volume of) balancing energy during a certain period. The contract period can vary from 
a year to a couple of hours. Variations are also possible, such as, e.g. a balancing capacity 
contract that states that the BSP should offer balancing capacity at peak hours for a particular 
week. The length of the contract period has an influence on the extent to which variable RES, 
storage and demand response may be able to participate in the balancing capacity market. 
Examples of the contract periods for different countries as in 2015 are shown in Figure 11. In 
that regard, the CEP, more specifically the EC proposal for the Regulation on the IME adds in 
Art. 5(9) that the maximum balancing capacity contract period shall be one day. 
 
 
Figure 11: Contract duration of balancing capacity in four countries as it was in 2015 (Brijs et al., 
2017) 
Art. 25(4) of the EB GL provides a list of characteristics for standard products in the balancing capacity 
(and energy) market. Examples of characteristics listed other than those already mentioned include 
the ramping period, i.e. determining how fast a BSP should be able to respond when activated, and, 
very importantly, the maximum duration of one activation. Other than fixed standard characteristics, 
there are also variable characteristics of a standard product to be determined by the BSP during the 
prequalification or when submitting the standard product bid. One of these variable characteristics is, 
of course, the price. Others are divisibility, location and the minimum duration between the end of the 
deactivation period and the following activation (EB GL, Art. 25(5)).  
 
All TSOs have to come up with a proposal for parameter values of these characteristics of standard 
products per reserve type (EB GL, Art. 25(2)). Standard products will allow a more fluid integration of 
balancing markets. The less standard products, the more liquidity. However, a trade-off exists between 
minimising the number of standard products to increase liquidity and having enough standard 
products to satisfy the wide range of technical needs of the different TSOs. This trade-off is one of the 
reasons that besides standard products, each TSO may develop a proposal defining specific products 
which could be used in parallel with standard products in their control area. These specific products 
should be demonstrated as necessary and non-distortive. Every two years an assessment is made 
about whether these conditions still hold (EB GL, Art. 26). 
 
Also of importance, and related to the contract period, is the time-lag between the gate closure of 
the balancing capacity market (the last moment a bid can be submitted) and the start of the contract 
period in which balancing energy should be offered to the balancing energy market . This time-lag 
can vary from a day to months and may differ by type of reserve. The time lag has an impact on how 
easy it is for market parties to estimate their opportunity cost, the closer to real-time the better 
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forecasts become, and how well a TSO can estimate its reserve needs. In this regard, Art. 32(2.b-c) of 
the EB GL states that the procurement process shall be performed on a short-term basis to the extent 
possible and where economically efficient, and that the contracted volume may be divided into several 
contracting periods. Art. 5(9) of the EC proposal for Regulation on the IME adds that ‘the contracting 
shall be performed for not longer than one day before the provision of the balancing capacity’. Further, 
it is clearly stated in the EB GL that the balancing energy gate closure time for standard products should 
be harmonised at the EU level.35 In terms of timing, the EB GL states in Art. 24 that the balancing 
energy gate closure time should not be before the intraday cross-zonal gate closure time and as close 
as possible to real-time. 
 
One other important choice is whether upward and downward balancing capacity/energy should be 
procured jointly, called ‘symmetric balancing products’, or separately, called ‘asymmetric balancing 
products’. It goes without saying that for some new players it might be easier only to offer balancing 
capacity/energy in one direction. For example, for a wind park, it might be possible to offer downward 
balancing capacity, meaning they would curtail part of the production. However, a wind park cannot 
as easily offer upward balancing capacity. When offering upward balancing capacity it would mean 
that the turbines would constantly have to generate less than their maximum, thus missing out of 
electricity generation at near zero marginal cost. Therefore, it is important that Art. 32(3) of the EB GL 
requires that the procurement of upward and downward balancing capacity, at least for FRR and RR, 
shall be carried out separately. However, each TSO may submit a proposal to the regulatory authority 
for a temporary exemption to this rule. Such a proposal must include an economic justification. The EC 
proposal for the Regulation on the IME tends to go one step further by stating in Art. 5(9) that ‘the 
procurement of upward balancing capacity and downward balancing capacity shall be carried out 
separately’. It is assumed that this means that the balancing capacity for all reserve types, including 
FCR, should be procured asymmetrically. 
 
Again, the ISP is an important parameter. Namely, in most balancing mechanisms, the ISP equals the 
market period of the balancing energy market (as also seen in Figure 11). The market period means 
the time unit over which balancing energy prices can fluctuate. The shorter this market period, the 
more flexibility will be valued. 
 
Last but not least, the settlement rule for the balancing market is a point of discussion. Balancing prices 
can be regulated, or the balancing markets can be organised as auctions for which two settlement 
options are possible: pay-as-bid or pay-as-cleared (marginal pricing). In the case of regulated prices, 
the prices are set by the regulator, and market participants (mostly large generators) are obliged to be 
available to offer balancing services. It can be seen in Figure 12 that the settlement rule was far from 
harmonised in 2015 when looking at different countries. Also, it can be seen that the balancing capacity 
and balancing energy market apply different rules.  
                                                           
35 It is unclear whether there can be a different harmonised European balancing energy gate closure per reserve 
type. This query requires a legal view on EB GL Article 24(1). 
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Figure 12: Settlement rule for balancing capacity and energy in four countries as it was in 2015 (Brijs 
et al., 2017) 
From a purely theoretical point of view, applying pay-as-bid or pay-as-cleared should give exactly the 
same outcome. In practice, this is not expected to be the case. The main difference is that when pay-
as-bid is applied, a bidder needs to estimate the price of the lowest accepted bid. To maximise its 
payoff, a market participant should bid that estimated price (if it is higher than its marginal costs). With 
pay-as-cleared, the optimal strategy for a market participant is to bid its marginal cost, under the 
condition that the market functions properly. If the market participant bids a price which is higher than 
its marginal costs, it can be that its bid is not accepted while a profit could be made. If the market 
participant bids a price which is lower than its marginal cost, it can be that the bid is accepted and a 
loss is made. From a system point of view, it could be argued that with pay-as-bid more market 
participants are expected to wrongly anticipate the price, and thus their bidding will lead to a less 
optimal scheduling of the available resources. For new players in the balancing market, an important 
argument in favour of pay-as-cleared pricing is that when pay-as-cleared is used instead of pay-as-
bid, the costs of forecasting the expected price can be saved.36 A counterargument for applying pay-
as-cleared pricing in balancing energy markets are implementation issues. For example, a problem with 
pay-as-cleared specific to balancing energy markets arises when different products of different reserve 
types are used at the same time to solve an imbalance. 
 
In the EB GL (Art. 30(1.a)) it is clearly stated that the balancing energy markets should be based on 
marginal pricing. However, if all TSOs identify inefficiencies in the application of marginal pricing, they 
may request an amendment and propose an alternative pricing method if proven more efficient (Art. 
30(5)). This exceptional application of the pay-as-bid rule is no longer allowed in the EC proposal for 
the Regulation on the IME. Regarding the settlement rule in balancing capacity markets, no statement 
is found in the EB GL or the CEP. However, Art. 32 of the EB GL states that the procurement method 
of mFRR, aFRR and RR capacity shall be market-based. The EB GL does not specify whether FCR 
capacity should be procured market-based or whether it can be obliged to market parties to offer FCR 
at regulated prices.   
 Balancing costs in Europe: capacity versus energy 
The balancing costs in several European Member State in 2016 are shown in Figure 13.  
                                                           
36 For a more complete overview of arguments supporting pay-as-bid or pay-as-cleared, please consult Box 3 in 
Meeus and Schittekatte (2018). 
35 
 
 
Figure 13: Overall costs of balancing (capacity and energy) and imbalance prices over national 
electricity demand in a selection of European markets in 2016 (ACER and CEER, 2017b)37 
Three observations can be made from Figure 13: 
 
- 1.) The balancing costs can vary strongly from one Member State to another. Differences can 
occur, for example, due to the generation mix (flexible or not) and the degree of 
interconnection of a certain Member State. Please note that low balancing costs do not 
automatically imply that a balancing mechanism is well-functioning. Electricity markets are a 
sequence of markets; it could be that ‘one segment’ functions very well due to sacrifices in the 
efficiency of other segments. The whole sequence should be assessed as a whole. 
 
- 2.) The balancing capacity costs significantly outweigh the balancing energy costs for almost 
all Member States. 
 
- 3.) The recuperated costs of the balancing mechanism through the imbalance settlement is in 
most cases slightly higher than the cost of balancing energy but is not sufficient to cover the 
total balancing costs. The remainder of not-recuperated balancing costs is socialised over grid 
users through the transmission tariff. 
 
Observations 2 and 3 are quite surprising. Observation 2 means that more money is being spent on 
reserving capacity (‘the insurance’) than on the actual delivery of energy. ACER and CEER (2016) 
describe two options to lower the balancing capacity costs. First, cross-border cooperation. Sharing 
of reserves (‘risk pooling’) and the exchange of balancing capacity (more efficient allocation of 
resources) could lead to lower costs. For a recent estimate of the welfare gains of cross-border 
cooperation in balancing capacity procurement see e.g. Baldursson et al. (2018). Second, a higher 
degree of participation of all technologies in the provision of balancing capacity, including variable 
renewables, storage and demand response, could lead to lower reservation costs. The EB GL seeks to 
support the realisation of both complementary solutions to lower the balancing capacity cost. 
 
                                                           
37 Imbalance charges applied in the Nordic market are not included in the figure as data were not available for 
all Nordic countries. The procurement costs of reserves reported by the Polish TSO comprise only a share of the 
overall costs of reserves in the Polish electricity system. 
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Observation 3 shows that less than the full cost of balancing is reflected through the imbalance 
settlement. Observations 2 and 3 are interrelated for the following reasons. Balancing capacity is 
reserved to make sure that, at all times, there are enough resources to balance the system in real-
time. In fact, balancing capacity is dimensioned to deal with extreme events. During these extreme 
events, in most cases, only the balancing energy price determines the imbalance price for the 
unbalanced BRPs. However, those instances are the real reason that large balancing capacity needs to 
be reserved in the first place. Thus, why not reflect the reservation costs in addition to the balancing 
energy costs at times of an ‘extreme event’, the instances when the available reserves are scarce, and 
the system could be at risk? This is the idea behind ‘scarcity pricing’ in the balancing energy market. 
This idea has already been implemented in some form in parts of the US under the name of Operating 
Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC), see, e.g. Hogan (2005) and Levin and Botterud (2015), and under the 
name Reserve Scarcity Pricing (RSP) in the GB (Ofgem, 2015). Papavasiliou and Smeers (2017) analyse 
the implementation of a similar idea in the Belgian power system. 
 
By applying scarcity pricing, imbalance prices could rise above the marginal cost of delivering balancing 
energy. In the GB implementation, the imbalance prices rise at moments of stress, but not the 
balancing energy prices paid to the BSPs activated at those moments. Although it is not the main 
objective of the mechanism, the difference between what is collected from the BRPs and paid to the 
BSPs can serve to partly recuperate the balancing capacity procurement costs. Also, with rising 
imbalance prices, BRPs are strongly incentivised to be balanced at moments of system stress. In the 
US implementation, both the imbalance prices and the balancing energy prices rise at moments of 
system stress. In that case, not only would BRPs be motivated to be balanced when it is really needed 
but also the BSPs would have a stronger incentive to be available at the moments when they are 
needed the most. As such, very flexible resources (e.g. demand response) would be rewarded more 
correctly for their services if they are present when they are really needed. Thus, these resources 
would be more incentivised to participate in the balancing market and also investment in such 
resources would be incentivised.  
 
Closing the loop, both implementations, to varying degrees, could lower the need for high volumes of 
balancing capacity to be procured, leading to lower total balancing capacity costs to be recuperated. 
An issue, as stated in Hogan (2013), would be that it is very difficult if not impossible to distinguish 
scarcity prices from the exercise of market power. Please also note the difference between ORDC and 
a penalty added to the imbalance price as for example described in Vandezande et al. (2010). First, a 
penalty is typically applied to the imbalance price in one imbalance direction, not on both imbalance 
directions. Second, a penalty is, in most cases, triggered when a certain threshold of balancing energy 
is activated in real-time. The activation of high volumes of balancing energy does not necessarily imply 
a situation of system stress as there might be an even higher volume of reserves available at that point 
in time. Regarding the allocation of balancing capacity procurement costs, in Art. 44(3) of the EB GL it 
is stated that: 
 
‘Each TSO may develop a proposal for an additional settlement mechanism separate from the 
imbalance settlement, to settle the procurement costs of balancing capacity, administrative costs and 
other costs related to balancing. The additional settlement mechanism shall apply to balance 
responsible parties. This should be preferably achieved with the introduction of a shortage pricing 
function. If TSOs choose another mechanism, they should justify this in the proposal. Such a proposal 
shall be subject to approval by the relevant regulatory authority.’ 
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